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THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF LATIN





The important role of Chinese demand for silver in stimulating world-
wide silver-mining and shaping the first truly global trading system has
become commonly recognised in the world history scholarship. The com-
mercial dynamism of China during the 16th-19th centuries was integrally
related to the importation of foreign silver, initially from Japan but princi-
pally from Latin America. Yet the significance of imports of Latin
American silver for the Chinese economy changed substantially over
these three centuries in tandem with the rhythms of China’s domestic
economy as well as the global trading system. This article traces these
changes, including the adoption of a new standard money of account—
the yuan—derived from the Spanish silver peso coin.
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RESUMEN
El importante papel de la demanda china de plata para estimular la
extracción de plata en todo el mundo y dar forma al primer sistema de
comercio verdaderamente global se ha reconocido comúnmente por los
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investigadores de la historia mundial. El dinamismo comercial de China
durante los siglos XVI-XIX estuvo relacionado integralmente con la
importación de plata extranjera, inicialmente de Japón pero principalmente
de América Latina. Sin embargo, la importancia de las importaciones de
plata latinoamericana para la economía china cambió sustancialmente a
lo largo de estos tres siglos en combinación con los ritmos de la
economía doméstica de China y con el sistema de comercio mundial. Este
artículo rastrea estos cambios, incluida la adopción de una nueva moneda
estándar de cuenta, el yuan, derivada del peso de plata español.
Palabras clave: plata, oferta de dinero, peso, acuñación, comercio
internacional
1. INTRODUCTION
Silver played a major role in the economy of late imperial China, a role
all the more remarkable given that Chinese governments never issued a sil-
ver currency before 1889. Even in the absence of an official silver currency,
over the course of the 15th century, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) grad-
ually adopted a fiscal system based on silver as the primary instrument
of money payments to the state. From the 16th century onward, commer-
cial growth heightened the demand for silver in market exchange and
spurred the import of foreign silver, initially from Japan and soon from
Spain’s American colonies as well. Silver remained China’s primary import
to the end of the 19th century, although the scale of imports and their sig-
nificance within China’s domestic economy varied over time. China
remained on a silver standard until the Republic of China’s Nationalist gov-
ernment instituted a currency reform in 1935, long after the nearly univer-
sal adoption of the gold standard elsewhere in the world, that replaced
silver coin with a new fiat paper currency.
Chinese and Japanese scholars have long recognised that the massive
import of foreign silver from Japan and Latin America was a crucial
force stoking the dramatic acceleration in the commercial growth of the
late Ming era (Momose 1935; Liang 1939). Western scholars have acknowl-
edged the stimulus foreign silver imparted to the Chinese economy, but
they have tended to emphasise the adverse effects of China’s incorporation
into the global economy through its imports of foreign silver. An unhealthy
dependency on foreign silver has been cited as a key factor in the fall of the
Ming dynasty in 1644. In this view, interruptions in the global production
and trade of silver in the mid-17th century caused devastating disruption to
the Chinese economy and left the Ming state unable to resist domestic
rebellion and foreign invasion (Atwell 1982, 1986, 2005; Wakeman
1986). Similarly, it has been argued that the drain of silver abroad in the
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second quarter of the 19th century—essentially to pay for opium imports—
triggered the cataclysmic Opium War of 1839–1842 and led to China’s sub-
ordination to the European-dominated global capitalist economy
(Greenberg 1951; Moulder 1977).
But these characterisations of China’s dependence on foreign silver and
vulnerability to supply shocks ignore the shifting dynamics of China’s
domestic economy and the place of silver within it. The «crisis» theories
mentioned above have been premised on the assumption that China’s
demand for silver remained constant over three centuries and ignore
both the character of silver as a trade commodity as well as fluctuations
in Chinese demand for silver. The scale of Chinese imports of silver—
which, after 1670, consisted almost exclusively of silver mined in Latin
America—varied over time. To understand these fluctuations and the sig-
nificance of silver imports to China, we must consider the rhythms of eco-
nomic trends within China and changes in the composition of its money
supply as well as international bullion flows.
2. CHINA’S «SILVER CENTURY» (1550–1650)
The first Ming emperor, Hongwu (r. 1368–1398), was determined to
expunge the preceding century of Mongol rule over China and eradicate
what he regarded as the corrupting taint of Mongol customs. In his effort
to restore the institutions and values of the agrarian society enshrined in
the Confucian Classics, Hongwu repudiated the robust market economy
that had developed in the Song dynasty (960–1276) and continued to
flourish under the Mongol regime. In pursuit of this agenda, the emperor
formulated fiscal policies predicated on a return to unilateral in-kind pay-
ments to the state, conscripted labour service, self-sufficient military farms
and payments to officials and soldiers in goods rather than money (von
Glahn 2016, pp. 285–289). Hongwu instituted a new type of inconvertible
paper currency (baochao), while simultaneously banning the use of gold
and silver (and for a period of time even state-issued bronze coin) as
money. But the baochao notes proved an abject failure and by 1425 they
ceased to function as viable currency (von Glahn 1996, pp. 70–73). The
Ming state also lacked sufficient supplies of copper to mint bronze coin
—the standard state-issued money since the founding of the first unified
empires in the 3rd century BCE—in sufficient quantities, and in the early
1430s suspended coinage altogether. As a result, the populace resorted
to uncoined silver as the principal means of market exchange. Yet the
upsurge in domestic silver mining that occurred during the first half of
the 15th century proved short-lived, hampering commercial growth.
In keeping with the anti-market tenor of his fiscal policies, Emperor
Hongwu also prohibited private maritime trade, restricting overseas
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contacts to a highly formulised system of tribute diplomacy that permitted
only a small volume of commercial exchange conducted under close gov-
ernment scrutiny. But the maritime ban became increasingly difficult to
enforce. Entrepreneurial seafarers from ports along China’s southeastern
coast were able to evade these restrictions due to lax enforcement and
the covert support of local elites who financed overseas ventures.
Ming control over foreign trade through the tributary system was utterly
upended in the 1530s, following the rapid development of silver mining in
Japan. By 1540, Chinese traders were swarming to Japanese ports to
acquire the silver so avidly treasured in China. This «silver rush» coincided
with the arrival of Portuguese seafarers in East Asian waters. The first
efforts of the Portuguese to negotiate trading privileges with the Ming gov-
ernment were rebuffed, but Portuguese traders soon joined with Chinese
smugglers to circumvent the Ming maritime embargo and deliver
Japanese silver to the Chinese market. In 1548, the Ming government
launched a concerted effort to eradicate the «Japanese pirates» (as they
dubbed the smugglers, although nearly all of them were Chinese) from
their offshore island bases along the southeastern seacoast. Despite the
capture of smuggler strongholds, however, the Ming was unable to inter-
dict illicit commerce. In an effort to sever the alliance between
Portuguese traders and the «Japanese pirates», in 1557 the Ming court
granted the Portuguese the right to establish a trading settlement at
Macau, with access to the Chinese market via Guangzhou. Finally, wearied
by the mounting costs of policing its maritime frontier, in 1567 the Ming
government repealed the maritime ban. Overseas Chinese trading voyages
were subject to government regulation and direct trade between China and
Japan was still prohibited, but the restoration of private trade set off a
boom in intra-Asian commerce.
Word of the enormous profits to be made in delivering silver to China
quickly spread throughout the Iberian merchant networks. The
Englishman Ralph Fitch, who travelled to the Portuguese bases through-
out the Indian Ocean between 1583 and 1591, reported that «when the
Portugals go from Macau in China to Japan, they carry much white silk,
gold, musk, and porcelains; and they bring from thence nothing but silver.
They have a great carrack which goes thither every year, and she brings
from thence every year about six hundred thousand cruzados; and all
this silver of Japan, and two hundred thousand more in silver which
they bring yearly out of India, they employ to their great advantage in
China» (Hakluyt 1903–1905: V, p. 498 [spelling modernised by author]).
The Spanish Crown, which had ceded the Spice Islands to the
Portuguese in the Treaty of Tordesillas, sought to challenge Portuguese
domination of the Japanese and Chinese markets by dispatching expedi-
tions to the Philippine archipelago. Manila Bay had long been a trading
post that attracted Chinese and Japanese seafarers, who exchanged silks,
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porcelain and metal goods for gold, beeswax and forest products. The
Spanish force that subdued the Tagalog chieftains of Manila Bay in 1571
had been ordered to establish a port of call that would provide access to
the rich China trade. The founding of the Spanish colony at Manila created
a new route of access to American silver through the trans-Pacific galleon
voyages, and Chinese traders quickly capitalised on this new opportunity.
In 1575, more than a dozen Chinese junks made port at Manila, and by
1584 some 25–30 junks were arriving each year. In 1593, the Spanish
Crown—now fearing a haemorrhage of silver from its American colonies
to China—backpedalled by establishing rules restricting the galleon trade
between Manila and Acapulco to two ships per year bearing a maximum
of 500,000 pesos. But the vested interests of Manila’s colonial settlers, as
well as Mexican merchants and colonial authorities in the profits of the
China trade, ultimately prevailed against royal inclinations to halt the gal-
leon trade altogether (Bjork 1998).
The export of Latin American silver—both via the trans-Pacific galleon
trade and through re-export of Spanish silver from European nations
across the Indian Ocean—was driven in part by the mounting appetite of
European consumers (and European colonials in Spanish America) for
artisanal wares from China such as porcelain and silk. But as Fitch and
other European merchants readily recognised, conveying silver to China
was immensely lucrative. Chinese hunger for silver was expressed through
its price (relative to gold and other commodities), which was far higher
than in Europe or the Americas. As Adam Smith would later observe in
The Wealth of Nations, «there is scarce any commodity which brings a bet-
ter price [in China and India]; or which, in proportion to the quantity of
labour and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or com-
mand a greater quantity of labour and commodities [in Asia]». Because
of the mutual advantages of this trade to Asians and Europeans alike,
«the silver of the new continent seems in this manner to be one of the prin-
cipal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of
the old one is carried on, and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that
those distant parts of the world are connected with one another» (Smith
1937, pp. 206–207). Thus, the arbitrage profit generated by delivering silver
to China was the mainspring for creating the first truly global trading sys-
tem (Flynn and Giráldez 1995).
Stimulated by Chinese demand for silver, East Asian maritime trade
thrived, spurring rulers throughout the region—with the notable exception
of the Ming itself—to promote foreign trade as advantageous to their
domestic economies (von Glahn 2019). After securing unified control
over Japan in 1602, the Tokugawa shogun Ieyasu embraced foreign com-
merce and negotiated trading arrangements with European merchants
and Southeast Asian potentates. The arrival of the Dutch in the first decade
of the 17th century under the aegis of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
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introduced a new institution—the chartered trading company—that chal-
lenged and soon displaced Portuguese traders from East Asian maritime
commerce. Like the Portuguese, the Dutch focused on procuring silver
from Japan for the Chinese market.
Measuring the scale of silver imports to China is difficult given the lack
of any archival records for trade or customs data from Ming China. The
prevailing practice scholars have adopted to determine the magnitude of
the silver trade is to estimate the flow of silver exports from the regions
that delivered silver to the Chinese market. This technique is fraught
with conjectures, as the diverse range of estimates for silver imports to
China shows (Table 1). Most scholars at least agree that imports of silver
from Japan were substantially greater than imports from Spanish
America (whether via the Atlantic or the Pacific) during the «Silver
Century» of 1540–1640. My own estimates, which arrive at a substantially
lower total for Japanese exports of silver to China, suggest that the volumes
of silver originating in Japan and Spanish America during this period were
roughly equal. (It should be noted that these estimates do not fully account
for smuggling, which occurred on a scale that defies any effort to calcu-
late.) The customs revenue (almojarifazgo) data from Manila indicates
that the peak of silver exports from the Philippines to China occurred dur-
ing 1595–1616, a period that accounted for 70 per cent of total Philippine
silver exports before 1645 (von Glahn 1996, p. 124, table 8). The great surge
in silver imports to China after 1620 came from Japanese mines rather
than Spanish American ones.
The decline in trade between Manila and China after 1615 resulted from
independent but convergent trends. In a memorial of 1609 Pedro de Baeza,
a Spanish official who had served for 30 years in the East Indies, urged the
Spanish Crown to exploit the immensely profitable opportunity to trade
New World silver for Chinese goods, including gold: «forasmuch as
throughout all the kingdom of China there is an enormous quantity of
fine gold of more than twenty-two carats touch, if this was brought to
New Spain, or to Castile, a profit of 75 or 80 per cent could be made»
(cited in Boxer 1967, p. 425). The arbitrage profit to be made by exporting
silver to China, Baeza argued, would fully offset Spain’s chronic deficits in
trans-Pacific trade. Yet Spanish colonial administrators in both Mexico
and Manila deplored the loss of silver to China, which they estimated to
be as much as 5 million pesos (equivalent to 128 tons, surely an exagger-
ated figure) per year, and sought to interdict this drain of silver out of
the empire (Atwell 1982). In addition, aggressive actions by the VOC to
wrest the Chinese market away from its Iberian rivals severely disrupted
commercial traffic between Manila and China. The Dutch attempt in
1622 to seize Macau was repulsed, but after establishing Fort Zeelandia
on Taiwan the following year, the VOC supplanted the Portuguese as the
primary European intermediary in Sino-Japanese trade. Moreover,
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Spanish American silver had to compete with Japanese silver exports,
which soared after 1610 (Figure 3).
Although some Ming statesmen were wary of the destabilizing effects of
foreign trade, others believed that foreign silver was a commodity of great
value to the Chinese economy. In 1630, during a brief renewal of the mari-
time ban, the Fujian native He Qiaoyuan urged the court to open China’s
doors to the rich profits that foreign trade yielded:
By the «Eastern Ocean» we mean Luzon, which is populated by the
Portuguese [sic]. Their country contains silver mountains, the prod-
uct of which the foreigners mint into silver coins in prodigious quan-
tities. When our Chinese subjects journey to trade in the «Western
Ocean» (i.e., continental Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean)
they trade the goods we produce for the goods of others. But when
engaging in Luzon they have designs solely on silver coins…. A hun-
dred jin of Huzhou silk yarn worth 100 taels of silver can be sold at a
price of 200 to 300 taels there. Moreover, porcelain from Jingdezhen
as well as sugar and fruit from my native Fujian all are avidly desired
by the foreigners.
Although mistaken in thinking that the silver coin Chinese merchants
brought from Manila was mined and minted in the Philippines, He was
doubtless correct in underscoring the real economic benefits of silver
imports both to Fujian and China as a whole. Foreign markets ensured
employment for weavers, potters and merchants, whose waxing affluence
TABLE 1











Lin (1990) 1,834 675 2,509
Zhuang (1995) 6,527 2,250 1,013 9,800
von Glahn
(1996/2013)
3,634–3,825 2,481 1,230 7,345–7,536
Li (2005) 6,375 4,688 11,250
Note: All figures in metric tons.
Sources: Liang (1939): pp. 173–179; Yamamura and Kamiki (1983): pp. 351–353; Lin (1990): p. 146;
Zhuang (1995): p. 3; von Glahn (1996): p. 140, table 13; von Glahn (2013): p. 32, table 2.6; Li (2005): p. 165.
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augured higher standards of living for all (He 1641, pp. 23.30b–34a).
Indeed, the court quickly rescinded the ban.
But by 1640 the high tide of silver imports into China had crested.
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s successors, having firmly consolidated their rule over
Japan, saw less advantage in overseas trade, particularly in light of the
alarming success of the Jesuit missionaries who accompanied
Portuguese traders in winning converts among the Japanese populace.
Beginning in 1636, the shogunate enacted a series of measures (which in
retrospect came to be called the «seclusion policies» [sakoku]) to constrict
the exposure of their subjects to Europeans: it withdrew the overseas trad-
ing privileges of Japanese merchants, expelled Portuguese traders together
with the Jesuits from Japanese soil, and confined Chinese and Dutch mer-
chants to the single port of Nagasaki, where trade was supervised directly
by shogunal officials. The dissolution of Portugal’s alliance with Spain in
1640 severed trade between Manila and Macau, and the bloody suppres-
sion of the uprising by Manila’s Chinese inhabitants in 1639 along with
Dutch depredations sharply curtailed Philippine trade with China as well.
As mentioned earlier, some scholars contend that a steep decline in the
import of foreign silver beginning in the late 1630s directly resulted in the
demise of the Ming dynasty. The origins of this «crisis thesis» go back to
the seminal studies of Spain’s Philippine trade by Pierre Chaunu, who
asserted that China’s commercial ties to European trade networks drew
it into orbit around a global economy «dominated by the powerful pulsa-
tions of the Atlantic zone» (Chaunu 1962, p. 570; see also Chaunu and
Chaunu 1953). Historians of China, unduly influenced by this conception
of a monolithic world economy, acceded to the premise that Ming China
was beholden to uninterrupted infusions of foreign silver to maintain its
economic prosperity. The most vigorous proponent of this view, William
S. Atwell, contends that the downturn in silver imports in the final years
of the Ming was the crucial factor in a «17th-century crisis» that culmi-
nated in the fall of the dynasty in 1644 (Atwell 1982, 1986, 2005).
However, the volume of silver imports into China during the last years
of the Ming declined only relative to the very high level attained in 1635–
1639. According to my calculation, the annual average of silver imports fell
from 115 metric tons in 1636–1640 to 50 tons in 1641–1645 (von Glahn
1996, p. 232, table 23). But my estimate of an annual average of 70 tons
of silver imports during the previous decade (1626–1635) is much closer
to the 1641–1645 level. Even if we accept the 1636–1640 level of imports
as the norm and conclude that there was a «deficit» of 325 tons during
the period 1641–1645, this «deficit» amounted to only 4.3 per cent of the
total quantity of silver (approximately 7,500 tons) imported during the pre-
vious century (and of course an even smaller proportion of the total silver
stock if we accepted the higher estimates of silver imports shown in
Table 1, not to mention existing domestic supplies). A 4.3 per cent decline
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in the total stock of silver most likely would have had only a modest impact
on China’s money supply and could not have caused the drastic effects
ascribed to it by the crisis theorists.
More recently, the Taiwan scholar Li Longsheng has provided new
quantitative evidence that supports scepticism about the claims for the
catastrophic impact of diminished imports of silver on the late Ming econ-
omy. Based on the calculations of the value of Chinese exports (especially
raw silk and silk cloth) and data on ship traffic, Li actually arrives at much
higher figures for silver imports from Japan into China during the last
years of the Ming. His data indicate that the level of silver imports to
China remained high until 1641, and then fell by one-third the following
year. Similarly, Li’s estimates for silver imports from the Philippines
show a large drop beginning only in 1643 (Table 2 and Figure 1). Li also
concurs with my conclusion that the decline of silver imports resulted pri-
marily from domestic social and economic turmoil in China—the outbreak
of widespread peasant rebellions, as well as epidemic disease in many
parts of China during the 1630s, is believed to have resulted in massive
mortality—rather than an interruption in supply because of disturbances
in the global economy (Li 2005, p. 19).
Atwell himself did not attempt to quantify aggregate silver imports into
China, and his analysis is grounded in a simplistic and flawed invocation of
the quantity theory of money. In his view, the decline of silver imports, exa-
cerbated by confiscatory taxation, caused a dramatic contraction in the cir-
culation of money that stifled the dynamic commercial growth of the late
Ming period. The resulting rise in the price of silver entailed a sharp fall in
the prices of goods, eroding both commercial and agricultural incomes.
But price movements in fact did not follow this trajectory. Rice prices
soared in 1638–1642 as a result of catastrophic harvests and dire famine
conditions. The prices of raw cotton and cotton cloth indeed fell during
these years, but quickly recovered by the end of the 1640s, while export
prices for silk textiles—China’s most important export—remained stable
throughout the 1640s (Kishimoto 1997, pp. 139–141; von Glahn 2013,
p. 34). The enormous leap in silver-denominated rice prices is hardly con-
sistent with claims that silver was withdrawn from circulation.
The argument for a scarcity of silver also is contradicted by another
trend observed in the late Ming: the falling value of silver relative to
gold. The gold price of silver steadily declined in China during the first
half of the 17th century, sinking to the prevailing international level exactly
at the moment the Ming dynasty fell (von Glahn 1996, p. 128, figure 4).
Thus, the value of silver relative to gold reached its nadir precisely when,
according to the crisis hypothesis, it should have peaked. The movement
of the gold–silver exchange ratio, like the inflation in grain prices, is incon-
sistent with the claim of a silver shortage.
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TABLE 2
CHINESE EXPORTS OF GOODS AND IMPORTS OF SILVER, 1636–1644






























1636 72.4 94.5 55.2 75.0 15.8 14.3 143.3 183.8
1637 99.0 126.8 102.4 135.8 13.5 7.1 214.9 269.6
1638 90.4 124.5 49.1 59.6 18.8 17.3 158.3 201.4
1639 92.6 132.8 70.9 91.1 21.4 19.9 184.9 243.8
1640 92.3 127.9 34.9 39.8 24.4 26.3 151.5 193.9
1641 81.0 120.0 103.1 106.9 23.6 19.5 207.8 246.4
1642 30.8 45.0 84.4 99.8 26.6 19.8 141.8 163.9
1643 28.9 42.4 37.5 53.6 20.3 12.8 86.6 108.8
1644 46.9 69.0 10.3 14.3 12.8 7.9 69.8 91.1
1636–44 annual
average
70.5 98.3 60.8 75.0 19.5 16.1 150.9 189.4
Note: Figures in metric tons of silver. Li gives figures in liang, which have been converted to metric tons here.
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3 HIATUS: THE KANGXI DEPRESSION (1660–1690)
The real turning point in Chinese importation of foreign silver came
after the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, in the last third of the 17th cen-
tury. Quantitative information for the Manila galleon trade is limited, but
ship traffic between Manila and China plunged after 1640. Extrapolating
from almojarifazgo receipts, only about 140 tons of silver was exported
from Manila to China during the half-century from 1640 to 1690
(Figure 2). Records of Japan’s foreign trade, which contain actual silver
export data for 1648–1672, reveal that silver exports to China (primarily
in exchange for silk imports) remained steady at slightly under 40 metric
tons annually from 1648 to 1657, then soared to an average of 75 tons
annually during 1658–1666. In response to this drain of bullion, the
Tokugawa shogunate abruptly prohibited all silver exports in 1668.
Although the ban was relaxed in 1672, new obstacles to international
trade imposed by the shogunate—including forcing foreign merchants to
negotiate with a new state-organised cartel of silk buyers—depressed silver
exports. During 1672–1683, Japanese silver exports fell to an average of 23
tons per year. Further restrictions imposed in 1683 and the debasement of
Japanese silver currency enacted in 1695 brought silver exports to a virtual
halt (Figure 3).
Chinese imports of foreign silver alsowere impeded by the ban on foreign
trade imposed by the new Qing dynasty (1644–1911) during 1661–1683 as
part of its effort to bring to heel the Zheng clan of merchant-princes, who
FIGURE 1
CHINESE SILVER IMPORTS, 1636–1644.
Sources: Table 2.
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had established their own separatist regime in Taiwan. But enforcement of
this interdiction, like the earlier Ming prohibition, was sporadic. More sig-
nificantly, the onset from c. 1660 of a protracted economic torpor—which
historians have dubbed the «Kangxi Depression», after the reigning Qing
emperor—sharply curtailed the market demand that had sustained the
high level of silver imports during the «Silver Century». The devastating
civil wars of the 1630s-1640s (far more ruinous than the Qing conquest,
which was relatively bloodless) induced a demographic collapse—roughly
estimated at 20 per cent of the peak population of 192 million reached in
1630 (Cao 2000, p. 451–452)—and economic turmoil that lingered long
FIGURE 2
PHILIPPINE EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1600–1700 (EQUIVALENT IN METRIC TONS OF
SILVER). EXTRAPOLATED FROM ALMOJARIFAZGO RECEIPTS.
Sources: Chaunu (1960): I, pp. 200–205.
FIGURE 3
JAPANESE SILVER EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1600–1700 (METRIC TONS).
Sources: von Glahn (1996): p. 232, table 23.
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afterwards. From 1655, a general decline in prices, rents and land values set
in that lasted until the 1690s. Rice and cotton prices declined in virtually per-
fect synchrony, showing that the depression affected agriculture andmanu-
facturing in equal measure (von Glahn 2013, p. 41, figure 2.11).
From the perspective of some Chinese observers, the economic depres-
sion was a direct consequence of the interruption of foreign trade, and sil-
ver imports in particular, by the Qing maritime ban instituted in 1661.
Around 1680, the governor of Jiangsu, Mu Tianyan, contrasted the current
economic doldrums with the prosperity of the 1650s:
I still remember that in 1649–50, before maritime trade was pro-
scribed, the marketplaces were filled with foreign goods. Buyers
and sellers mostly used foreign silver coins as the medium of
exchange, and thus these coins circulated widely in every province.
But nowadays not a single foreign coin is to be had (cited in von
Glahn 1996, p. 217).
Around the same time another prominent official, Jin Fu, warned the court
of the deleterious effects of the maritime ban: «ever since the measures
banning foreign trade and forcing the evacuation of the coastal population
were enacted, not a single plank of wood has set out to sea. After the pas-
sage of twenty years, the circulation of silver shrinks day by day, and sellers
cannot dispose of their mounting inventories of goods». Asserting that «sil-
ver indeed is the lever by which the treasures of the earth are controlled»,
Jin admonished the court to lift the ban on foreign trade and restore the
prosperity China had enjoyed in the early years of the dynasty (cited in
von Glahn 1996, p. 216).
But we cannot accept at face value such assertions that the Kangxi
Depression resulted from interruptions in the supply of silver to the
Chinese market. The slump in prices began around 1655, a full decade before
the cessation of silver imports (as Figure 3 shows, the 1655–1665 decade
actually witnessed a pronounced increase in silver imports compared to
the previous decade)1. Moreover, the end of the maritime ban in 1683
brought no immediate relief. Economic doldrums persisted, and prices
and interest rates only began to rise—the onset of a sustained, century-long
inflationary trend—after 1700. Moreover, the economic efflorescence of the
18th century was sustained by a growing money supply fuelled mostly by a
sharp increase in mint output of bronze coin rather than by silver imports
(Figure 6).
1 In a recent study, Jian-jing Tang (2016, p. 55, figure 4) shows that interest rates surged in the
first two decades of the Qing dynasty, then plummeted between 1665 and 1680, thereafter remain-
ing at a historically low level until the first decade of the 18th century. In my view, this pattern
reflects the falling demand for capital during the Kangxi Depression.
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The prolonged deflation of the Kangxi Depression should be under-
stood in terms of a diminished demand for goods rather than a conse-
quence of reduced silver imports. The falling labour/land ratio yielded
higher wages and low rents, making farming less profitable and land-
ownership a less attractive investment. As expectations of prosperity
waned, investment in production declined. Ironically, despite a «shortage»
of labour, unemployment in artisanal and manufacturing industries rose,
weakening consumer demand even more and causing prices to fall even
lower. Deflation discouraged spending, and the preference for holding
money caused the value of bronze coin to rise in tandem with silver—
indeed, even more dramatically.
4 REVIVAL OF SILVER IMPORTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY
As Figure 2 shows, silver imports from the Philippines rose once the
Qing government lifted the maritime ban in 1683, following its conquest
of the renegade regime in Taiwan. Contrary to long-abiding assumptions
about the insularity of the Chinese empire, the Qing government adopted
what one scholar has recently described as «open-door» policies towards
foreign trade that severed trading privileges from the diplomatic protocols
of the tributary system (Zhao 2013). With the exception of a brief interdic-
tion (spurred by national security considerations) of maritime relations
with Southeast Asia during 1717–1727, China’s foreign trade flourished
throughout the 18th century. The English author of an encyclopaedia of
commerce published in London in 1751 described the disposition of the
Chinese to engage in foreign trade in the following terms:
At present … by opening commerce with other counties, the Chinese
have increased the means of enriching their own. They now not only
suffer, but encourage both near and distant nations… to come and
trade with them; and bring them the most valuable commodities;
and, at the same time, allow their own people unto a great number
of foreign parts, whether they carry their silks, porcelain, and
other curious manufactures and knick-knacks, as well as their tea,
medicinal roots, drugs, sugar, and other produce. They trade into
most parts of East India; they go to Batavia, Mallaca, Ache, Siam,
etc. No wonder then that it is so opulent and powerful, when all
the four parts of the globe contribute to make it so (Postlethwayt
1751, vol. 1, p. 492)2.
2 This passage was added by the English author and does not appear in the French original,
which was published 30 years earlier.
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In 1760, the Qianlong Emperor, angered by the impudence of a British
merchant who audaciously dispatched a letter (written in Chinese) to
the court seeking more liberal terms of trade, decreed that henceforth all
European merchants would be confined to the port of Guangzhou
(Canton) and must conduct business through a cartel of designated
Chinese counterparts. Despite these restrictions, European trade with
China boomed in the second half of the 18th century. The main obstacle
to further growth of Sino-European trade was not political interference
by the Qing government but the imposition of trade cartels in the form
of «East Indies» chartered trading companies by all of the major
European commercial nations.
Silver imports rose steadily along with the remarkable economic
growth of China across the 18th century. The English East India
Company (EIC), having abandoned efforts to crack the Dutch monopoly
on Southeast Asian spices, achieved a dominant position in European
trade with China (Figure 4). The EIC also became the main European sup-
plier of silver to the Chinese market. Before 1785, imports of silver to
China from Europe fluctuated with the vicissitudes of British foreign
trade, with notable declines during the Seven Years’ War and the
American War of Independence. Overall, the inflow of foreign silver exhib-
ited a steady and dramatic increase across the 18th century, from under
1 million pesos annually in 1719–1726 to nearly 3.5 million pesos (roughly
90 tons) per year during 1785–1791 (Figure 5). The year 1785 marked a key
turning point in this inflow of foreign silver. Not only did the total volume
of Western trade at Guangzhou double within the space of a few years, but
following its independence from Britain, the fledgling U.S.’s merchant
marine was liberated from the EIC monopoly and able to trade directly
with China. American merchants enjoyed the advantage of ready access
to Mexican silver. In addition, «country traders» (British merchants who
circumvented the EIC monopoly by engaging in intra-Asian trade) began
to rival the EIC in their share of the China trade (Figure 4). Finally, the
EIC, buoyed by sharply rising sales of Indian cotton and opium to
Chinese consumers, began to finance its China trade with bills drawn on
London rather than payments in specie. As a result, the spectacular
increase in silver imports to China at the turn of the 19th century was dri-
ven almost entirely by the exponential growth of Sino-American trade.
The data presented in Figure 5 do not include the flow of silver across
the Pacific via the galleon trade and smuggling, which also swelled in
the 18th century. Ship traffic between Manila and China—increasingly
centred on the port of Xiamen in Fujian—rose dramatically after the lifting
of the Qing maritime ban, reaching its peak level between 1720 and 1740
(Ruiz Stovel 2019). Unfortunately, we lack quantitative data for silver
imports from the Philippines to China during the 18th century, especially
since much if not most of the silver exported from Mexico was shipped
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FIGURE 4
SHIPPING TONNAGE AT GUANGZHOU, 1719–1833.
Sources: Dermigny (1964): 2, p. 532.
FIGURE 5
COUNTRY SHARE OF SILVER IMPORTS TO CHINA, 1719–1833.
Sources: Dermigny (1964): 2, p. 735.
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clandestinely. The Extracto historial commissioned by the Spanish Crown
in 1736 reported that commercial traffic between New Spain and the
Philippines regularly exceeded the royally-decreed limit of 600,000 pesos
for the galleons by 2 million pesos annually in the years before 1712,
and rose to as many as 4 million pesos in the 1720s (Abreu 1736,
pp. 241, 293), at a time when silver imports into China via Europe averaged
only 1 million pesos annually. Royal governors in Manila and Mexico
reported that the contraband trade routinely exceeded 2 million pesos
per year (Schurz 1959, pp. 189–190). After the British occupation of
Manila (1762–1764), however, trade between the Philippines and China
abruptly declined. Manila’s overseas trade revived with the establishment
of a direct route between Manila and Cadiz following the founding of
the Royal Philippine Company in 1785 and the opening of the port of
Manila to all European shipping in 1789. But as a consequence, the
trans-Pacific galleon trade atrophied long before its official suspension in
1813 (Yuste López 2007). The boom in imports of Latin American silver
into China after 1785 occurred at a time when the galleon trade had
been all but extinguished.
FIGURE 6
GROWTH OF CHINA’S MONEY SUPPLY, 1726–1833 (ANNUAL AVERAGES).
Sources: Bronze coin mint output: Vogel (n.d.): pp. 606–460, appendix D.4; Silver imports: Dermigny
(1964), 2: p. 735; Coin-silver exchange ratios: Vogel (1987): pp. 17–23, appendix 3.
LATIN AMERICAN SILVER IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY, 16TH–19TH CENTURIES
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 569
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 07 Jan 2021 at 12:49:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
The rise in Chinese silver imports was of course a product of the sur-
ging output of silver at Latin American mines, notably in Mexico. In the
18th century, Mexico produced 80 per cent of the world’s silver, and the
pesos minted in Mexico were by far the most prevalent coin in inter-
national trade. Mexico’s silver production rose from 4.4 million pesos
per year c. 1700 to an average of 21 million pesos annually in the 1790s.
The high tide of Mexican mint output occurred during the latter half of
the reign of Carlos III (r. 1759–1788) and under his successor, Carlos IV
(r. 1788–1808), reaching a peak annual output of 24 million pesos on the
eve of Hidalgo’s revolt in 1810 (Coatsworth 1986; Garner 1988). Chinese
imports of foreign silver coin paralleled the rising output of Mexican
(and to a lesser extent Peruvian) mines.
As noted earlier, China experienced robust economic growth in the 18th
century. The demographic recovery that began modestly around 1700
accelerated dramatically in mid-century, and by 1800 China’s population
had increased nearly threefold since the late 17th century. Prices rose as
well, with land prices keeping pace with the inflation of rice prices
(Table 3)3. Increases in agricultural and industrial output promoted mar-
ket integration and long-distance trade. Recent comparative studies have
shown that long-distance trade in 18th-century China operated more effi-
ciently than in most of Europe. Although the Yangzi Delta region lagged
behind England in overall market efficiency, it achieved levels comparable
to or surpassing continental Western Europe (Shiue and Keller 2007).
The influx of Latin American silver certainly helped to lubricate the
wheels of commerce and sustain this protracted economic expansion. At
the same time, the Qing government was able to tap newly-developed
copper mines in southwestern China to increase the output of bronze
coin at state mints nearly tenfold compared to the late 17th century.
During 1740–1785, the average annual output of bronze coin was equiva-
lent in value to 125 tons of silver at a time when silver imports averaged 50
tons per year (Figure 6). It was also precisely at this time that bronze coin
rose in value relative to silver (Table 3, Figure 7)—exactly the opposite of
what a crude quantity theory of money would predict. Rather than depres-
sing its value, the abundance of bronze coin enhanced its reliability as a
means of exchange and store of value. The demand for bronze coin was
most acute in highly commercialised regions such as the Yangzi Delta,
where bronze coin displaced silver as the monetary standard in the
mid-18th century (Kuroda 1987). Although bronze coin was always more
convenient than uncoined silver ingots in everyday transactions, at this
3 Interest rates rebounded after the Kangxi Depression from c. 1710, and domestic economic
turbulence caused interest rates to soar in the 1740s–1750s (a period of poor grain harvests). But
interest rates stabilized—at a level well above the nadir of the late 17th century—from 1765 until
the turn of the 19th century. See Tang (2016): p. 55, figure 4.
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time we also see a preference for bronze coins for large-scale transactions
such as sales of arable land and real estate (Kishimoto 1997, pp. 353–363).
5. CREATION OF THE SILVER DOLLAR (YUAN) MONETARY
STANDARD
In addition to the re-emergence of a bronze coin standard in private
commerce in the 18th century (the state continued to employ an uncoined
TABLE 3






Rice prices Rice prices Land prices
(bronze coin) (silver) (silver)
1601–10 111 – – 97 146
1611–20 106 80 – 82 133
1621–30 101 66 – 132 128
1631–40 96 143 – 122 128
1641–50 90 363 – 171 147
1651–60 85 161 135 163 130
1661–70 106 123 96 116 108
1671–80 103 123 73 88 82
1681–90 88 97 97 117 83
1691–1700 100 100 100 100 100
1701–10 96 133 132 131 104
1711–20 103 81 127 126 118
1721–30 107 82 116 119 118
1731–40 105 84 137 136 116
1741–50 152 68 147 155 128
1751–60 181 66 222 222 186
1761–70 186 82 244 236 254
1771–80 189 83 217 206 254
1781–90 238 93 236 218 258
1791–1800 249 104 442 266 240
Note: 1691–1700 = 100.
Sources: von Glahn (2003): p. 191, table 9.1.
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silver [sycee] unit of account in its fiscal accounts), Chinese began to use
Spanish silver coins as means of exchange. Previously, imported silver
coins were melted down and recast into ingots. Since this recasting was
done by private assay shops and moneychangers rather than public author-
ities, a heterogeneous array of silver ingots of varying fineness proliferated
across the vast territory of the Chinese empire. Commercial handbooks
such as the Shanggu bianlan (Baedeker for Merchants, published in 1792)
provided copious details on the differing sycee standards in scores of cities
both large and small (Wu 1822). The Spanish «Carolus dollars»—that is,
pesos issued during the reigns of Carlos III and Carlos IV—that had
begun to flood Chinese markets offered the convenience of highly uniform
standards of weight and fineness, and thus were gradually adopted as
means of exchange within the domestic economy.
Given their unfamiliarity with the iconography and inscriptions on
peso coins, Chinese invented their own vernacular nomenclature to iden-
tify foreign coins. Prior to 1772, the Carlos III pesos featured a design, dat-
ing back to the Habsburg dynasty and Charles V in the 16th century,
bearing on the obverse the royal coat-of-arms surmounted by the
Spanish crown and on the reverse the two hemispheres of the New and
Old Worlds underneath a crown and flanked by the pillars of Hercules.
In China, these coins were dubbed «Double Pillar» or «Three Gong»
coins. («Three Gong» because the Roman numeral III to Chinese eyes
appeared as three consecutive gong 工 graphs; gong simply means
FIGURE 7
INDICES OF SILVER:BRONZE COIN EXCHANGE RATIOS AND BRONZE COIN
OUTPUT, 1691–1800 (1721–1730 = 100).
Sources: Vogel (n.d.): pp. 414–424, table C.1; pp. 606–632, table D4.2.
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«work» and had no semantic value in this context.) Carlos III changed the
design of his coin in 1772, with a bust of the king replacing the twin hemi-
spheres on the obverse while adding the pillars of Hercules to the Bourbon
coat-of-arms on the reverse, a pattern followed by the Carlos IV coins as
well. In China, these Carolus dollars were chiefly known as «Buddha
Head» (fotoumian) coins, probably alluding more to the Spanish mon-
archs’ identity as foreigners than any resemblance to the patriarch of the
Buddhist religion.
Spanish coin first achieved success as a monetary standard in the south-
ern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, where foreign trade was
concentrated, in the mid-18th century. An examination of contracts for
land sales and mortgages from Quanzhou, a major port in southern
Fujian (adjacent to Xiamen, the hub of Sino-Philippine trade), reveals pro-
nounced shifts in the preferred means of payments over time (Figure 8).
Foreign silver coins began to replace sycee silver in Quanzhou in the
1730s. The «Buddha Head» coin is already mentioned in Quanzhou con-
tracts in 1788, the year of its first issue, by which time foreign silver
coins served as the means of payments in more than three-quarters of
these land transactions. After 1810 sycee silver disappeared as a means
of payment, and the majority of transactions specified payment in
«Buddha Head» coins. From the 1830s, when China for the first time in
centuries experienced a net outflow of silver, bronze coin reappeared as
a means of payment, but more than two-thirds of contracts continued to
be denominated in foreign silver coin. By the late 1860s, foreign coin
(and the «Buddha Head» coin in particular) regained nearly complete
dominance until the issue of China’s own first official silver currency
beginning in 1889.
By 1800, the Carolus dollar also had become established as the monet-
ary standard in the markets of the Yangzi Delta. Zheng Guangzu, writing
c. 1844, directly attributed the predominance of foreign silver coin in the
major cities of the delta region to its utility as a medium of exchange:
Since 1683, when the embargo on maritime trade was repealed,
merchants from various overseas countries have come to
Guangdong and Fujian. Initially, though, only sycee silver was
employed. We first hear of silver coins in common circulation in
the early Qianlong reign (1736–95). After 1775, foreign silver coins
began to appear in Suzhou and Hangzhou. At that time in my native
prefecture of Suzhou coin-denominated remittance notes (qianpiao)
were widely used along with fine sycee silver. Afterward the price of
silver rose steadily, and foreign coins gradually displaced sycee sil-
ver. Among them were the «Horse-riding Swordsman» (i.e., the
«Silver Rider» dukaton of the Dutch Republic), which weighed
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0.94 liang4 and had an exchange value of 900-plus bronze coins. The
«Double Pillar» and «Buddha Head» coins both weighed 0.73 liang
and had an exchange value of 700-plus bronze coins. From
1785 onward the «Buddha Head» coin was used exclusively.
Subsequently foreign coins predominated because they were con-
venient to carry and exchange. Their value also increased. In the
city of Suzhou the prices of all goods are fixed in silver coin
(Zheng 1844, p. 6.44a).
Numerous contemporary observers confirm Zheng’s assertion that foreign
silver coin had become the dominant means of payment in market
exchange (von Glahn 2007, pp. 56–57; Kishimoto 2019, pp. 124–126).
Yet at the same time, rural land sale contracts in the Yangzi Delta region
continued to be denominated in bronze coin (as they had since the
mid-18th century), while urban real estate sales in Suzhou and Shanghai
were almost always transacted in sycee silver (Kishimoto 2019, p. 124,
table 10, p. 128, tables 11, 12). Thus domestic currencies continued to pre-
vail in land sales (large but infrequent transactions, which perhaps best
FIGURE 8
MEANS OF PAYMENT IN QUANZHOU LAND SALE CONTRACTS, 1700–1900
Sources: von Glahn (2007): p. 55, figure 1.
4 The Chinese unit of weight liang corresponded to 37.5 g.
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attest to the store of value function of money), even as imported silver
coins demonstrated their superior versatility as means of exchange. Still,
the circulation of foreign silver coins was restricted to the more commer-
cialised southeastern coastal provinces, and they were hardly ever seen in
the interior regions.
Ultimately, Carolus pesos—and subsequently Mexican Republican
dollars—became so prevalent as the media of ordinary exchange that
they became a new de facto monetary standard, expressed in Chinese as
yuan (meaning «solid round coins», in contrast to Chinese bronze coins,
with a perforated square hole at their centre) which gradually superseded
the liang (or «tael») unit used for sycee ingots. The currency of the People’s
Republic of China today, the renminbi, is still denominated in yuan units,
the term originally coined for the Carolus dollar.
6. NINETEENTH-CENTURY REVERSALS IN SILVER FLOWS
Chinese imports of foreign silver—overwhelmingly in the form of
Spanish-American coins—rose sharply in the early decades of the 19th cen-
tury, to roughly 4 million pesos (around 100 tons) per year (Figure 5).
However, after 1827, the centuries-long inflow of foreign silver reversed,
and for the next three decades, China suffered a net outflow of silver
abroad (Table 4). It has long been argued that this «drain of silver» caused
the acute economic distress that China experienced during the period
1820–1850 (the «Daoguang Depression», also named after the reigning
emperor). Contemporary Chinese statesmen and a large body of modern
scholarship have attributed the «drain of silver» to the dramatic increase
in opium imports in the first half of the 19th century, although the volume
of opium imports cannot account for more than half of the silver exports
during 1827–1855. More recently, Man-houng Lin (2006) has proposed a
different analysis that emphasises a global crisis in the production of pre-
cious metals and a worldwide economic depression that eroded demand
Chinese exports such as tea. Neither of these explanations for the reversal
in the flow of silver is satisfactory5. Instead, more attention must be paid to
changes in the demand for particular types of money, both in China and in
the global market.
Man-houng Lin’s argument that the silver crisis in China was precipi-
tated by a marked decline in global production of silver is derived from
Pierre Vilar’s strongly bullionist analysis, in which economic cycles are
tightly yoked to the flow of monetary metals (Lin 2006, pp. 108–110, citing
Vilar 1976). But as Alejandra Irigoin has demonstrated, the decreased flow
of silver to China cannot be explained by a decline in Mexican silver
5 For a full consideration of these arguments, see von Glahn (2018).
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production or coinage. The outbreak of Hidalgo’s rebellion against Spain
in 1810 initially resulted in a sharp fall in the output of Mexico’s mints.
During the decade of the 1810s, Mexican output of coin declined to
about 40 per cent of its previous level, but still averaged 8 million pesos
per year. After the founding of the Mexican Republic in 1821, mint produc-
tion gradually rose from 9 million pesos annually in the 1820s to nearly 15
million per year in the 1830s and over 17 million annually in the 1840s
(Figure 9). During the 1830s-1840s, when the net outflow of silver from
China reached its peak, Mexican silver mining and coinage had recovered
to its earlier levels. The significant difference was that in contrast to the
uniform quality of Spanish imperial coins like the Carolus peso, the
coins issued by the new Latin American republics varied widely in quality.
Cash-strapped governments and private coiners readily resorted to adulter-
ating the coin they issued. In Mexico, provincial mints—which minted the
great majority of Republican dollars before 1857—were especially notori-
ous for the poor quality of their coins (Irigoin 2009).
The marked deterioration in the quality and uniformity of Latin
American coin after 1810 was especially noticeable in the irregularities
in the designs stamped on the coins. Chinese merchant manuals published
in the 1820s and after carefully discriminated among these provincial
issues. Coins from the most prolific of the provincial Mexican mints,
Guanajuato and Zacatecas (which produced 71 per cent of total Mexican
coinage during 1821–1850), were stigmatised by Chinese merchants as
«fishhook coins», in reference to their «G» and «Z» mint-mark
TABLE 4
NET FLOW OF SILVER FROM CHINA, 1818–1854
A B Net flow of silver
Silver imports Silver exports (A–B)
1818–20 19.31 9.42 +9.89
1821–25 26.13 5.12 +21.01
1826–30 12.72 25.68 −12.96
1831–35 5.17 24.98 −19.81
1836–40 2.77 32.26 −29.49
1841–45 2.34 53.67 −51.33
1846–50 0.24 30.82 −30.57
1851–54 0.82 21.51 −20.69
Total 69.51 203.46 −133.95
Note: All figures in millions of pesos.
Source: von Glahn (2013): p. 50, table 2.10
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monograms, which in Chinese eyes appeared similar to the Chinese graph
for «fishhook» (written as gou 句). The Chinese merchant manuals uni-
formly agreed that initially the «fishhook» coins were sound, but over
time their quality (in craftsmanship and metallic content) declined precipi-
tously. Moreover, these coins were widely counterfeited in China, and thus
became subject to steep discounting (von Glahn 2007).
We must keep in mind that a crucial feature of the silver market in
China at this time was the marked difference in the currency circuits for
imports and exports. Imports consisted almost exclusively of Spanish
American coins (especially the Carolus pesos), while exports took the
form of silver ingots destined for British India (some of this silver was
minted into imitation Carolus pesos in India and then re-exported back
to China). The cessation of the minting of Carolus pesos after the death
of Carlos IV in 1808 and the steep discounts applied to other silver coins
undoubtedly was one reason for the abatement of Chinese demand for for-
eign silver. But the chief reason for diminished silver imports between
1827 and 1857 was the Daoguang Depression, a protracted domestic eco-
nomic crisis characterised by declining prices, real wages, land values
and trade (von Glahn 2016, pp. 361–374, 2018).
To be sure, changes on the supply side also figured into the reversal of
silver flows. As Figure 5 shows, after 1800 American merchants were by far
the main suppliers of silver coin to the Chinese market, accounting for 83
per cent of total silver imports. The EIC ceased to import silver into China
in the 1810s, but American merchants, who enjoyed a strongly favourable
balance of trade with Spain’s American colonies both before and after their
independence, continued to carry great quantities of Mexican coin to
China. The United States in 1792 had raised its mint price for silver
above the prevailing world price (to an exchange rate of 15:1 with gold,
in contrast to the European standard of 15.6:1), encouraging pesos minted
in Mexico to flow into the United States. The ample supply of Mexican coin
prompted the United States to cease minting its own dollars in 1806 and
declare the Carolus dollar legal tender. Yet much of this imported silver
was re-exported to finance U.S. trade with China. Between 1805 and
1834, American merchants exported 130 million silver pesos, one-third
of Mexico’s total coinage during that period, to China. But in 1834, the
United States shifted monetary policy, lowering its price for silver below
the international standard in order to draw in gold. Thus American mer-
chants no longer had cheap silver to finance trade with China, and export
of silver to China tailed off dramatically. However, despite the devaluation
of silver, Mexican coins continued to flood the American market. Surging
population growth and westward expansion fuelled the demand for even
mediocre Mexican coin, despite the measures taken by the U.S. govern-
ment to deter the circulation of low-quality coins. Only in the 1850s,
after the gold strikes in California eased the demand for hard currency,
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did these measures bear fruit. The United States finally succeeded in
demonetizing low-quality Mexican coins and removing them from circula-
tion in 1857—coincidentally, the same year that China once again regis-
tered a net inflow of foreign silver (Schell 2001, pp. 110–111; Irigoin
2009, pp. 225–232).
The minting of Carolus dollars had ceased with the death of Carlos III
in 1808, but preference for these coins in the Chinese market endured,
resulting in a sharp appreciation in their value relative to the domestic
bronze coin. In Suzhou, the hub of China’s national market, the exchange
rate of Carolus dollars relative to bronze coin, which had stabilised c. 1800
at around l:850, spiked to 1:1100–1200 in 1840, and then held steady
around 1:1300–1400 throughout the 1840s. At the same time, we also
find a strong appreciation of the Carolus dollar against sycee silver. The
exchange rate that had prevailed since the late 18th century (0.72 tael)
had overvalued the Carolus dollar (which contained only 0.684 liang of sil-
ver) by about 5 per cent. By 1840, Carolus dollars were being rated at 0.81–
0.82 tael, or in other words a premium of 18–20 per cent. At its peak in
1855, the value of the Carolus dollar in the Yangzi Delta region exceeded
0.90 tael, or more than 30 per cent greater than its equivalent in silver bul-
lion (von Glahn 2007, pp. 62–67).
Following the Qing defeat of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864, China
entered a new phase of economic recovery and reconstruction. Global
trade integration sharply increased the demand for Chinese export goods
such as tea and silk, which—along with the substitution of domestic
opium for imports from India—restored a positive balance in foreign
trade. Imports of Mexican silver again surged. As in the past, the vast
majority of the silver coins minted in Mexico was exported to China, a
trend that accelerated after the United States adopted the gold standard
in 1873 (Schell 1996).
The flood of Mexican Republican dollars in the second half of the 19th
century finally displaced the Carolus peso as the monetary standard in the
major commercialised regions of China. The Mexican Republican dollar
was adopted as the monetary standard in the British colony of Hong
Kong in 1842, but it made little headway in Chinese markets before the
resurgence of imported silver coin in the 1860s. Although Chinese and
Western merchants in Shanghai had adopted the Shanghai tael, a purely
abstract sycee money of account, as their monetary standard in 1857,
Spanish and Mexican silver coins continued to serve as the life-blood of
local commerce. From 1867 onward, the Mexican dollar traded at a pre-
mium of around 5 per cent above its official tariff (based on the
Shanghai tael), and in some years of economic distress (1872, 1876,
1911–1912) its premium rose to 12 per cent or more (Zhang 2003). The
1889 gazetteer for Songjiang prefecture (which included the city of
Shanghai) noted that the Carolus peso was becoming scarce, while
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«today merchants and shopkeepers without exception conduct business
using the Mexican dollar as the monetary standard» (Songjiangfu xuzhi:
5.15a). Yet even after the Mexican dollar established its pre-eminence,
the Carolus peso and its Chinese imitations were frequently used in retail
trade. The Carolus peso also continued to trade at a premium in interior
commercial centres such as Wuhu, the capital of Anhui province and a
major hub of the tea trade, into the early decades of the 20th century
(von Glahn 2007, p. 72).
Only in 1889 did the Chinese government—more specifically, the pro-
vincial administration in Guangdong—begin to issue its own yuan silver
dollars (and also subsidiary copper coins), which the Qing court recog-
nised as legal tender. The Guangdong dollar was minted according to
the standards of weight and fineness established by the Mexican
Republican dollar. However, the Qing court, stung by the dismal miscar-
riage of its abortive fiat currency experiment during the Taiping
Rebellion, resisted appeals to reintroduce paper money. Both foreign and
domestic banks issued their own banknotes, but the circulation of these
bills was essentially limited to the major ports of foreign trade. By the
end of the Qing dynasty, China still depended heavily on silver coin as
TABLE 5







New forms of money 1,629 65
Silver coins 1,320
Domestic coins 240 10
Imported coins 1,080 43
Copper coins 149 6
Paper money 160
Silver dollar notes 50 2
Foreign banknotes 110 4
Old forms of money 862 35
Silver taels 347 14
Copper cash 373 15
Silver tael notes 42 2
Copper cash notes 100 4
2,491
Note: Figures in millions of silver dollars.
Sources: Peng (1965): pp. 888–889; Yen-p’ing Hao (1986): p. 68, table 5.
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its principal currency, while the various types of paper money in circula-
tion altogether comprised only 12 per cent of the total money supply
(Table 5). Imported Latin American coin comprised nearly half of the
total money supply, and would retain its substantial place in the Chinese
monetary system down to the demonetisation of silver and the inaugur-
ation of the fabi fiat currency by the Nationalist government in 1935.
7. CONCLUSION
World historians have placed great emphasis on Chinese demand for
foreign silver and its effects on the world economy (Flynn and Giráldez
1995, 2002; Frank 1998). This scholarship has given a different twist to
earlier work on China’s incorporation into the global economy, which
decried the adverse effects of China’s subordination to a monolithic system
of international trade and its dependence on infusions of foreign silver.
That body of scholarship considered the dynamics of the flow of silver
into and out of China purely in aggregate terms, without distinguishing
among the different types of silver, the commodity trades which they
served, and the separate spheres of circulation for the various types of
money employed by Chinese. Monetary diversity and heterogeneity of
FIGURE 9
OUTPUT OF MEXICO CITY AND PROVINCIAL MINTS, 1810–1850 (IN MILLIONS
OF PESOS).
Sources: Peralta (1998): p. 134, table 3; p. 146, tables 5-6.
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demand were abiding features of the monetary system of imperial China,
which should caution us against economists’ tendency to think of money
as an undifferentiated aggregate. Kuroda Akinobu has rightly drawn atten-
tion to the «asymmetry» of monetary media in the premodern world, that
is to say, «the difficulty of harmonizing heterogeneous demands for money
and uneven supplies of currency» (Kuroda 2008, p. 18; see also Kuroda
2003). Kuroda particularly draws attention to the variation in the spatial
range of money use in late imperial China, contrasting the monetary
needs of local markets—dominated by highly seasonal demand for cur-
rency at harvest and tax collection times—with the needs of long-distance
merchants for much more liquid monetary media. Bronze coin tended to
disperse and settle in pools in local markets, remaining largely idle («stag-
nant» is Kuroda’s term) most of the time. Silver instead was more mobile,
flowing through higher-level currency circuits, and rarely settling in local
markets (on this point see also Kishimoto 2019). Yet silver, too, was sub-
ject to strong regional preferences, as can be seen in the dozens of distinct
sycee tael standards that existed in 18th-century China, and the slow pro-
gression of the Carolus dollar yuan standard in the 19th century. When
we recognise the different types of monetary demand at work in the
Chinese economy, a more nuanced pattern of monetary circulation
emerges that calls into question analytical models which reduce silver to
a simple monetary quantum and treat the movement of silver merely as
a reaction to shifts in commodity flows that served to restore equilibrium
to the balance of payments in foreign trade.
Since the rise of silver as the principal form of money in China in the
15th century, the Chinese economy had relied on imports of foreign silver
to provide the crucial elasticity to the money supply that fostered commer-
cial growth. Indeed, the ties between the Chinese monetary system and
international circuits of monetary exchange had a much longer history,
dating back to the 12th century. But it is incorrect to conclude that the
influx of foreign silver after 1540 created a dependency that subordinated
the Chinese economy—which even in 1800 generated at least one-fifth of
global economic output—to the vicissitudes of a hegemonic global econ-
omy dominated by Europe. The vectors of international silver flows under-
went repeated and substantial alterations from the 16th to the 19th
centuries, and the significance of foreign silver to the Chinese economy
as well as the relationship of the Chinese economy to the global economy
changed as well. Only through close attention to the demand for silver (and
monetary media generally) within the Chinese economy can we begin to
appreciate the reciprocal effects of the global trade in silver on the
Chinese and Latin American economies, and how those effects changed
over time.
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